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One hoped-for side effect of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, which lowered trade and invest-
ment barriers between Canada, Mexico and the
United States beginning in 1 January 1994, was faster
economic and job growth in Mexico that would slow
unwanted Mexico-US migration. Instead, Mexico-US
migration has surged: the number of Mexican-born
US residents almost tripled to 12 million between
1990 and 2010. The NAFTA-related migration hump
– the surge in Mexico-US migration to over 500,000 a
year – turned out to be far larger and to persist far
longer than expected, reflecting supply-push condi-
tions in Mexico, demand-pull factors in the United
States, and networks that link Mexican workers to US
jobs. This paper explains the factors in Mexico and
the United States that allowed Mexico-US migration
to increase rapidly and why it will be hard to reduce
Mexico-US migration in the short term. 
Mexico-US migration
Between 1820 and 2010, over 75 million immigrants
arrived in the United States. About half were from
Europe, including a tenth from the leading country of
immigration, Germany. However, only four percent of
German immigrants arrived since 1980, compared
with three-fourths of Mexican immigrants, which is
why Mexico surpassed Germany as the leading coun-
try of immigration in 2007. A quarter of the legal
immigrants in the United States and over half of
unauthorized foreigners, were born in Mexico. 
How did Mexico become the major source of US
immigrants? In 1800, Mexico and the United States
had populations of roughly equal size, six million,
and Mexico’s per capita GDP was about half that of
the United States. Northern Mexico (now the south-
western US states) was transferred to the United
States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848,
ending a war that began when American settlers
moved into Mexican territory and rebelled against
Mexican authority. The relatively few Mexican resi-
dents of what is now the southwestern United States
became Americans, and there was relatively little
migration and trade between these Distant
Neighbors1 for the next century (Riding 1989).
The US population grew with immigration and births
and the United States industrialized in the first half of
the 20th century; Mexico had high birth and death
rates, a much slower growing population, and an
agrarian economy marked by large landowners and
poor peasants. Early in the 20th century, when
Mexico was undergoing a civil war to break up its lat-
ifundia, the US government approved the recruitment
of Mexican workers to come to the United States as
guest workers. These so-called Braceros (arms) were
young Mexican men admitted legally between 1917
and 1921 and again between 1942 and 1964 to work
on US farms and railroads. 
Both of the Bracero programs that brought Mexican
men into the United States as guest workers began dur-
ing wartime emergencies, when farmers said that they
faced a shortage of labor. Both got larger and lasted
longer than expected because of distortion and depen-
dence. Distortion reflects the assumptions of US farm-
ers that Braceros would continue to be available,
prompting investments in orchards and vineyards that
may not be profitable if a reduced inflow of Braceros
raised wages, which prompted farmers to resist efforts
to reduce or end the Bracero program (Martin 2009). 
Meanwhile, some Mexicans became dependent on
higher wage US jobs, and moved their families to the
border to increase the chance of being selected as a
Bracero.2 When the Bracero program ended in 1964,
* University of California, Davis.
1 Mexico’s desire to avoid closer ties with the United States was sum-
marized in the aphorism, ‘Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to
the US’.
2 Farmers had to pay transportation costs from the place of recruit-
ment in Mexico. By moving to border cities, Mexicans improved
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Focus
during the height of the Civil Rights movement and
amidst concern about poor Americans, thousands of
Braceros and their families in Mexican border cities
had no way to earn a living. In a bid to discourage
them from migrating to the United States, the
Mexican and US governments modified their trade
laws to allow the creation of maquiladoras, factories
in Mexican border cities that imported components,
hired Mexican workers to assemble them into goods
such as TVs, and re-exported the finished products.
The maquiladoras never provided many jobs for ex-
Braceros, who were almost all men, because they pre-
ferred to hire young women.
Even though many rural Mexicans had experience
working in US agriculture, there was relatively little
illegal Mexico-US migration during the 1960s and
early 1970s, the so-called golden era for US farm
workers. About 110,000 Mexicans were apprehended
just inside the Mexico-US border in FY65, the year
after the Bracero program ended. The number of
apprehensions gradually rose, reaching 420,000 in
FY71 and topping a million in FY77 and FY78, when
the leader of the United Farm Workers, Cesar
Chavez, complained that Mexican ‘wetbacks’ were
making it hard for US farm workers to win wage
increases (Martin 2003).
Mexico had extremely high population growth rates
during the 1960s, when Mexican women averaged
7.2 children. After oil was discovered in the Mexican
part of the Gulf of Mexico in 1978, the Mexican
government, anticipating ever-higher oil revenues,
went on an unsustainable spending spree that ended
with a sharp peso devaluation in 1982 and increased
illegal migration to the United States. Appre-
hensions of Mexicans just inside the Mexico-US
border topped 1.2 million in FY83, and averaged
about 1.5 million a year for the next 15 years. The
Border Patrol handled internal enforcement within
the United States, and agents seeking unauthorized
foreigners would surround farms and workplaces
and try to catch workers who ran away. However,
employers were not punished for hiring unautho-
rized workers, and there was not enough enforce-
ment to prevent their spread from farms to con-
struction sites, factories and restaurants.
The US government responded to rising illegal
Mexico-US migration with the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which introduced
penalties on US employers who knowingly hired
unauthorized workers. The theory was that ‘closing
the labor market door’ would discourage Mexicans
from attempting illegal entry over the loosely guarded
2,000 mile border, since it would not be worth taking
the risk to cross the border illegally if employers
shunned unauthorized workers to avoid fines. How-
ever, unauthorized Mexicans soon learned that they
could still get US jobs by showing forged documents
or documents belonging to legal workers, enabling
those who eluded border agents to find jobs as before.
Meanwhile, IRCA legalized 2.7 million unauthorized
foreigners, 75 percent Mexicans, creating millions of
new links between legal Mexicans in the United States
and their relatives and friends in Mexico.
In 1990, there were 4.3 million Mexican-born US res-
idents, and most were legally in the United States as a
result of the legalization in 1987–1988. The number of
Mexican-born US residents tripled over the next two
decades to 12 million, and today over half are not
authorized to be in the United States. This means that
two-thirds of Mexican-born US residents arrived
since 1990, and most are unauthorized, despite legal-
ization to wipe the slate clean and enforcement efforts
aimed at deterring their entry. The third element in the
effort to deter unauthorized Mexico-US migration
was NAFTA, a trade and investment agreement that
was expected to speed up economic and job growth in
Mexico keep Mexicans there.
NAFTA and migration 
Mexico in the mid-1980s changed its economic poli-
cies from inward-looking to outward-looking, shifting
from a policy that protected local industries from
imports to a policy that lowered trade barriers to
attract foreign investors. Mexico joined the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986 (now the
World Trade Organization). A Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) went into effect with little fanfare
in 1989, prompting the Mexican government to pro-
pose its own FTA with the United States in 1990. The
result was the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which went into effect 1 January 1994.
Mexico’s then President, Carlos Salinas, asserted that
lowering trade and investment barriers in North
America would allow Mexico ‘to export goods, not
people’.3
NAFTA put Mexico on the economic map for US
and other foreign investors. Foreign investment
3 Quoted in Elisabeth Malkin, “Nafta’s Promise, Unfulfilled”, 
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poured in and trade increased, making Mexico the
second-largest trading partner of the United States,
after Canada. But NAFTA got off to a rough start in
Mexico, with a sharp peso devaluation in 1994 and a
deep recession that sharply lowered wages and
increased unemployment. NAFTA hastened changes
already underway in Mexico, such as accelerating
rural-urban migration. Many young women left rural
areas to seek jobs in border-area maquiladoras, and
many young men headed to the United States. For
both men and women, the mantra was ‘go north for
opportunity’.
Rural Mexico presented a special challenge. When
NAFTA went into effect in 1994, a quarter of
Mexicans lived in rural areas, three fourths of
Mexico’s poverty was in rural areas, and over half of
the Mexicans in the United States were from rural
Mexico. During the Mexican Revolution of
1910–1917, the battle cry was land for the peasants,
and Article 27 of the Mexican constitution redistrib-
uted large landholdings into ejidos whose farmer-
members could farm their land, and pass it on to their
heirs, but not rent or sell it. In 1992, after decades of
rural poverty, the Mexican government modified
Article 27 in anticipation of NAFTA to allow the
rental and sale of ejido land, assuming that ejido
members agreed (Cornelius and Myhre 1998).
The combination of allowing ejido land to be rented
or sold and the employment and wage changes asso-
ciated with NAFTA signaled especially young people
in rural Mexico that their future lay elsewhere. One
dimension of the displacement challenge in Mexico is
evident in corn production. In the early 1990s, the US
state of Iowa produced twice as much corn as the
country of Mexico, and at about half the price the
Mexican government offered to farmers who had corn
to sell. With about half of the days worked in
Mexican agriculture devoted to corn production, free-
ing up trade in corn meant that millions of rural
Mexicans would have to find alternative jobs. The
hope was that many Mexican farmers would shift
from producing corn to labor-intensive fruits and veg-
etables, but lack of knowledge, investment, and infra-
structure, plus the continued availability of Mexican
farm workers in the United States, meant that much
of the growth in labor-intensive agriculture occurred
in the United States rather than Mexico.
Mexicans could have stayed in Mexico and found
non-farm jobs. However, the creation of formal sec-
tor jobs has been too slow to absorb the growing
labor force and make a dent in widespread underem-
ployment. Mexico’s GDP growth has been less than
three percent over the past three decades, including
the 15 years since NAFTA went into effect; with the
population growing by over one percent a year, per
capita GDP growth averaged about 1.5 percent per
year. The gap between GDP per capita in the United
States and Mexico, about five to one according to
the World Bank, has narrowed only slightly since
NAFTA went into effect in 1994, when the gap was
about six to one. 
Most experts say that the Mexican economy must
average six percent economic growth to create enough
jobs to reduce the gap in GDP per capita and the eco-
nomic incentive to migrate (Weintraub 2010).4 The
Mexican education system must also be reformed to
justify higher Mexican wages. Mexicans adults in
2010 have an average eight years schooling. The
Mexican government via the Opportunidades
(Progresa from 1997–2002) is trying to break the
inter-generational transmission of poverty by educat-
ing children, providing payments to the mothers of
poor children every two months if the child was in
school at least 85 percent of the time. The payments
increase as children get older, reflecting the rising
opportunity cost of going to school, since 15 and
16 year olds could work and earn more than younger
children (Levy 2006). In 2010, Opportunidades pro-
vided support to five million poor Mexican families
(there are about 26 million families in Mexico) at a
cost of 3.6 billion US dollars. About 85 percent of
Opportunidades recipients are in rural Mexico.
By 2010, Mexico had a population of 110 million and
a labor force of 45 million. Both the population and
labor force are expanding by a million a year (OECD
2010). Mexico offers too few formal-sector jobs to
keep Mexicans at home. Only half of Mexico’s work-
ers are wage and salary employees, according to the
OECD, and many of those who appear to have formal
sector jobs are employed only part time, making them
ineligible for these benefits. The number of private
sector jobs enrolled in IMSS, Mexico’s social security
system, has remained at about 15 million since 2000.
There are about eight million Mexican-born workers
in the United States, which means that a third of
Mexicans with formal-sector jobs are in the United
States. Until Mexico can add formal-sector jobs at a
faster pace over time, especially young Mexicans with
4 Weintraub (2010) characterizes the Mexico-US relationship as
dependent-dominant, that is, the Mexican economy is dependent on
the dominant United States to accept its exports and its migrants.CESifo Forum 4/2010 41
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friends and relatives already in the United States will
continue to migrate north for opportunity. 
The migration hump
NAFTA accelerated changes already underway in
Mexico, adding to rural-urban migration, creating
higher wage jobs near the Mexico-US border, and
displacing workers from jobs in previously protect-
ed industries in central Mexico. These NAFTA-
linked changes meant that some Mexicans who
were previously protected behind trade barriers in
agriculture and industry had to find new jobs, and
made it clear to many small farmers in rural
Mexico that a better life lay elsewhere. However,
poor education systems in rural Mexico meant that
many of those leaving rural Mexico were not pre-
pared for good jobs in Mexico or the United States
(Levy 2008).
NAFTA provides an example of an economic policy
that produces pain before gain, that is, the same
trade and investment policies that should reduce
unwanted international migration in the long term
can increase such migration in the short term.
Analyses of free trade agreements generally find that
countries that are more fully integrated into the
world economy grow faster than countries that are
more closed to the global economy. However, these
comparative static analyses are based on before and
after comparisons; they often ignore the migration
that occurs as richer and poorer economies with a
pre-existing migration relationship lower barriers to
trade and investment.
International migration, legal and unauthorized, can
rise as especially poorer economies already experienc-
ing out-migration adjust to economic integration, cre-
ating a migration hump. Reducing trade barriers can
displace workers in both poorer and richer countries,
as when garment and auto parts factories closed in
the United States when these factories shifted to
Mexico and Mexican farmers and workers making
heavy equipment lose their jobs as imports from the
United States rise. The displaced US workers rarely
migrate to Mexico, but some of those displaced in
Mexico migrate to the United States, so that migra-
tion and trade can increase together, especially if freer
trade displaces Mexican workers faster than foreign
investment creates new jobs in Mexico. Eventually,
faster economic and job growth in Mexico should
reduce Mexico-US migration. 
The migration hump is pictured in Figure 1. The
solid line through B represents the rising migration
expected without economic integration as a result of
rapid labor force and slow formal sector growth in
Mexico. The extra migration in the hump is pictured
above A, which shows how economic integration
leads to an increase in migration over the status quo
trajectory. However, economic integration should
also speed up economic and job growth in Mexico,
so that migration falls below the status quo level at
B, after 15 years in the figure. As faster economic
and job growth in Mexico continues, migration is
projected to fall even more, and area C represents the
migration avoided by economic integration.
Eventually, some migrants may return from abroad
as net emigration turns into net immigration, as
occurred in Ireland, Italy and Spain.
Table 1 
Mexico-US population and labor force 1970–2010 
Year Mexico United States
1970 Population  (million)
Labor force (million)


















Total formal sector jobs (million)
• Filled with Mexicans (million)
Employment in Agriculture (million)









2050 Population  (million)
Labor force (million)







Sources: US Census and Conapo for the United States, 2050 projections from Population Reference Bureau
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The critical policy parameters are A, B, and C – how
much additional migration results from economic
integration (A), how soon does the hump disappear
as migration returns to the status quo level (B), and
how much migration is avoided by economic integra-
tion and other changes (C)? Generally, there must be
a pre-existing migration relationship and three more
factors for economic integration between poorer and
richer countries to lead to a migration hump: a con-
tinued demand-pull for migrants in the destination
country, an increased supply-push in the country of
origin as freer trade displaces workers and accelerates
changes under way such as rural-urban migration,
and migration networks that can move workers
across borders.
These conditions were present in the case of Mexico
and the United States. Migration was the major rela-
tionship between Mexico and the United States for
most of the past half century, which enabled migra-
tion networks to make rural Mexicans aware of job
opportunities in the United States. The US govern-
ment did not develop an effective policy to keep unau-
thorized workers out of US jobs and, when Mexican
government policies and NAFTA accelerated dis-
placement in rural Mexico, more Mexicans migrated
to the United States. Today, 10 percent of the 120 mil-
lion people born in Mexico live in the United States.
With their US-born children, the United States has
absorbed at least 25 million people who would other-
wise live in Mexico.
There are three central policy messages of the migra-
tion hump. The first is the need for policy makers to
acknowledge the potential for a pain-before-gain
increase in migration with closer
economic integration, requiring
e.g. the Mexican government to
cooperate to reduce the open
massing of Mexicans on the
Mexican side of the border to
attempt illegal US entry. The sec-
ond policy message is that trade
and other policies should be
implemented in ways that make
the migration hump smaller and
shorter, such as phasing in freer
trade slowly in areas with the
most labor displacement and not
changing policies that add to
migration, as when Mexico
allowed the rental and sale of
ejido land at about the same time
that NAFTA went into effect. 
The third policy message is to link economic integra-
tion with enhanced cooperation to manage migration
so that the migration hump migration does not lead to
a backlash that slows freer trade and investment.
Mexican and US trade negotiators, saying that it was
hard enough to negotiate NAFTA, took migration off
the table. Except for NAFTA’s Chapter 16, which cre-
ates freedom of movement for college educated resi-
dents of Canada, Mexico, and the United States who
have job offers in another NAFTA country5, migra-
tion is not dealt with in NAFTA.
Mexican and US responses
The Mexican government’s response to rising
Mexico-US migration in the 1990s was to emphasize
that most Mexican migrants found US jobs, suggest-
ing that they were needed because US employers
hired them. The Mexican government argued that the
migration hump should be turned into legal migra-
tion with a guest worker program negotiated cooper-
atively. Then Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary
Jose Angel Gurria in 1996 said: “the phenomenon of
migration can be beneficial and offers great potential
advantages to both the migrants’ original and new
countries, but only when a common vision on this
phenomenon is reached”.6
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5 The major effect of Chapter 16 has been to move Canadian profes-
sionals into US jobs with TN visas. About 20 percent of Mexicans
with doctorates are in the United States, and half of the
20,000 Mexican PhD holders in the United States entered since 1990.
6 Quoted in Migration News (1996), Mexican Views on
Immigration, Vol. 3, No. 11,
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1072_0_2_0CESifo Forum 4/2010 43
Focus
The efforts of commissions and task forces to design
mutually acceptable guest worker programs were not
successful, even during the late 1990s when the US
unemployment rate dipped below five percent. There
was hope for a new era in Mexico-US migration in
2000, when Mexicans elected Vicente Fox President in
July 2000, breaking the 70-year hold of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) on power,
and George W. Bush, who advocated a new guest
worker program during the campaign, was elected US
President in November 2000.
During the spring and summer of 2001, Fox pressed
Bush for a comprehensive immigration reform. Fox
was especially bold in calling for freedom of move-
ment. In January 2001, Fox said: “when we think of
2025, there is not going to be a border. There will be
a free movement of people just like the free move-
ment of goods”.7 Some US and Mexican advisors
urged Fox to press for more than just a guest worker
program, and Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge
Castaneda in June 2001 summarized Mexico’s four-
pronged immigration agenda to include legalization
for unauthorized Mexicans, a large guest-worker pro-
gram, a reduction in border violence and an exemp-
tion of Mexico from visa quotas, ending with what
became a memorable phrase: “it’s the whole enchila-
da or nothing”.
Fox and Castenada were in Washington DC just
before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, when
Fox said that he expected the United States to enact
comprehensive immigration reform before the end of
the year.8 The terrorist attacks turned attention else-
where and accelerated the addition of Border Patrol
agents and fences on the Mexico-US border so that
terrorists could not use the migration infrastructure
developed to move Mexican workers into the United
States. Smuggling fees rose from 200 to 300 US dol-
lars in the early 1990s to 2,000 to 3,000 US dollars a
decade later, and migrants who paid more to enter the
United States illegally were more likely to settle
because of the difficulty and expense of re-entry.
In 2005, when the US unemployment rate dropped
toward five percent and unauthorized Mexicans dif-
fused throughout the United States in agriculture,
construction and services, Congress once again tack-
led Mexico-US migration. Under Republican leader-
ship, the House approved the Border Protection,
Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act
in December 2005, which took an enforcement-only
approach to unauthorized migration. The House bill
called for mandatory screening of newly hired as well
as existing employees to ensure they are legally autho-
rized to work in the United States and would have
made ‘illegal presence’ in the United States a felony,
which would have made harder for unauthorized for-
eigners to eventually become legal immigrants. This
so-called Sensenbrenner bill prompted massive
demonstrations against an enforcement-only
approach and in favor of legalization in spring 2006,
culminating in a May 1 ‘day without immigrants’
protest.
Under Democratic leadership, the Senate took a dif-
ferent approach, approving the Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) in May 2006.
CIRA included more enforcement, as in the House
bill, as well as new earned legalization and guest
worker programs. Unauthorized foreigners in the
United States at least five years could become ‘pro-
bationary immigrants’by proving they had worked in
the United States, paid any back taxes owed and a
USD 1,500 fee, and passed English and background
tests. After six years of continued US work and tax
payments and another USD 1,500 fee, they could
apply for immigrant visas, a process called fees are
‘earned legalization’.9 This so-called Kennedy-
McCain bill approved by the Senate was not consid-
ered by the House and died.
The Senate debated a revised Comprehensive Immi-
gration Reform Act (CIRA) in 2007 that was tougher
on unauthorized foreigners, but opponents blocked a
vote on the bill despite the active support of President
George W. Bush. During the 2008 presidential cam-
paign, Barack Obama expressed support for CIRA,
but John McCain reversed his previous support and
said that enforcement must precede legalization.
Obama has several times repeated his support for com-
prehensive immigration reform, but Congressional
action has been blocked by opponents of legalization
and opponents of new enforcement efforts that could
increase discrimination against minorities.
7 Quoted in Migration News (2001). Mexico: Guest Workers, Vol. 8,
No. 2, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2297_0_2_0
8 Fox said: “the time has come to give migrants and their communi-
ties their proper place in the history of our bilateral relations … we
must, and we can, reach an agreement on migration before the end
of this very year ... [so that] there are no Mexicans who have not
entered this country legally in the United States, and that those
Mexicans who come into the country do so with proper documents”
– quoted in Migration News (2001), Fox Visits Bush, Vol. 8, No. 10,
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2463_0_2_0.
9 Unauthorized foreigners in the United States for two to five years
would have to satisfy the same requirements, but in addition return
to their countries of origin and re-enter the United States legally, and
those in the United States less than two years would be expected to
depart, although they could return legally as guest workers.CESifo Forum 4/2010 44
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The stalemate in Congress has encouraged some
states and cities to enact laws to deal with illegal
migration. Some have been friendly to unauthorized
foreigners, such as issuing them ID cards or prohibit-
ing police from asking about the immigration status
of persons they encounter, but most have aimed to
make life difficult for unauthorized foreigners.
Arizona in April 2010 enacted the Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070),
which makes it a state crime for unauthorized for-
eigners to be in the state. A federal court injunction
blocked SB 1070 from going into effect, agreeing with
opponents that regulating immigration was strictly a
federal responsibility. Mexican President Felipe
Calderón, who reportedly has relatives living illegally
in the United States, said that SB 1070 “introduces a
terrible idea: using racial profiling as a basis for law
enforcement”.
Legal and unauthorized Mexico-US migration con-
tinues with no end in sight. Economic and job
growth in Mexico was slowed by the 2008–2009
recession and by longer term factors that range from
the rising preference of some foreign investors for
China and other Asian countries to a government
effort to deal with drug gangs that left over
30,000 people dead in four years. The United States,
which has about 15 million unemployed workers, is
projected to have an unemployment of over nine per-
cent for the next several years, and to experience
especially slow growth in the residential construction
employment that employed many Mexican-born
workers.10 Sluggish growth and drug wars in Mexico
may encourage Mexicans to migrate northward,
while more border enforcement and high unemploy-
ment may counter this migration, making migration
a continued irritant in Mexico-US relations even as
NAFTA promotes economic integration. 
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